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THE EU AND CENTRAL ASIA 
For the first time since the collapse of 
communism, the EU is facing a 
strategic challenge in its external 
policies. The rise of Russia and China 
as international actors – with India close 
behind – and the growing confidence of 
some leading regional powers, such as 
Iran, are creating a serious threat to the 
EU’s ambition to apply external policies 
that reflect European values. Against 
this background, the employment of the 
democracy – promotion agenda 
developed during the 1990s is unlikely 
to be effective and may even serve to 
weaken the position of the EU in key 
regions. This situation demands an 
urgent and far-reaching rethink of the 
approach the Union takes to external 
relations. If the EU is to remain a 
serious global actor, it will have to find 
ways to reconcile the imperative of 
engaging in difficult regions beyond the 
immediate European neighbourhood 
while also remaining true to the values 
of the Union. 
An initial test of the Union’s ability to 
meet the challenges of the shifting 
international order is taking the form of 
the EU’s relationship with Central Asia. 
The region has recently emerged as an 
important focus for the EU for various 
reasons. Much has been made of the 
security challenges and energy 
opportunities in Central Asia – although 
it is also clear that obtaining access to 
energy resources is far from straight-
forward. Others have highlighted the 
EU’s obligation to foster 
democratisation and promote human 
rights in one of the world’s most 
authoritarian regions. Above all, it is 
clear that the European Union’s ability 
to exert a positive impact on regions 
vital to the EU within Eurasia, such as 
the south Caucasus and the Black Sea, 
and important countries – notably 
Russia, Ukraine and Afghanistan – will 
be greatly enhanced if the EU can also 
play a more active role in Central Asia. 
Advancing the EU’s interests in Central 
Asia while also remaining true to the 
Union’s values will clearly be a tall 
order. Since independence, the region’s 
leadership has shown an almost genetic 
disposition to despotic rule. Central 
Asia has also become the focus of 
attention for Moscow and Beijing, 
which are anxious to gain access to the 
region’s energy resources and to ensure 
stability and security along their 
borders. Both are little troubled by the 
need to promote political reform in the 
region. 
In response to the challenge of 
developing deeper relations with 
Central Asia, the European Union – 
following the initiative of the German 
Presidency – is drafting a Strategy for 
Central Asia. This is an important and 
welcome development. The strategy 
offers an opportunity to bring forward 
new and creative ways to address the 
issues that face Central Asia and to do 
so in a comprehensive and strategic 
fashion. 
Finding the right mixture of policies 
will clearly be an important part of 
developing the EU Strategy for Central 
Asia. But there is also a more important 
task for the Strategy. If the EU is truly 
to be a strategic actor in Central Asia, 
then the Strategy must set out a path for 
engagement in the region that offers the 
prospect of enhancing the Union’s 
influence through promoting policies 
that strengthen political, social and 
economic change in the region. In this 
respect, the Strategy should distinguish 
the EU from those international actors 
who are focused exclusively on stability 
and the status quo in the region. The 
Strategy should aim to build for the 
Union a clear identity as an agent for 
assisting with modernisation, reform 
and progressive development in the 
region in line with European standards. 
This will require careful, 
comprehensive and well-targeted 
policies and a light-footed approach. 
The key to the success of such a 
strategy will lie in identifying, engaging 
with and strengthening the dynamic of 
reform that already exists in key parts of 
the region. 
THE EU’S CHALLENGE IN 
CENTRAL ASIA 
Central Asia is undergoing fundamental 
change. The change is multi-
dimensional in character and uneven in 
its impact and it is simultaneously 
affecting the states and the societies of 
the region. As a result, Central Asia has 
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entered its most important period since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. The way in which the current 
changes are managed is likely to define 
the future of the region for a generation, 
if not longer. In response to these 
changes either the region’s existing 
political regimes will be restructured to 
meet the new conditions and, thereby 
provide the foundations for an 
authoritarian and unstable future, or 
parts of Central Asia will emerge as 
locations for substantial and sustainable 
processes of political, social and 
economic reform, with important 
implications for the wider region. 
External actors will play a key role in 
defining the contours of change in the 
Central Asia. In recent years, a variety 
of powerful countries – principally 
China, the Russian Federation, and, to a 
lesser extent, the United States, Japan 
and Turkey – have sought to enhance 
their influence in Central Asia. The 
emphasis placed by many of these 
nations on ensuring stability – 
motivated in large part by interests in 
energy and other natural resources, 
geopolitics and by concerns about 
security threats from the region – raises 
the prospect that external influence will 
be directed to support the status quo in 
the region. 
To date, the European Union has played 
a marginal role in Central Asia. The 
initiative by the German Presidency of 
the European Union to launch a process 
of rethinking the involvement of the EU 
in Central Asia, culminating with the 
production of a Strategy on Central 
Asia, is thus timely. The European 
Union has the opportunity to strengthen 
its presence at a strategic moment for 
Central Asia. At the same time, the EU 
is seeking to upgrade its role in Central 
Asia from a weak position and with 
little in the way of new or increased 
resources. Strengthening the Union’s 
engagement in the region and enhancing 
its leverage can only be achieved 
realistically by playing to Europe’s 
strengths. 
The European Union cannot be a status 
quo actor in Central Asia. Such an 
approach would stand in opposition to 
European values and it would not be in 
the interests of the Union. Moreover, it 
would not be a politically tenable 
position amongst many of the Union’s 
member states. The European Union’s 
greatest strength is its commitment to 
the combination of economic and social 
modernism, political pluralism, rule of 
law and cultural diversity. To 
compromise on these values would be 
to undermine the EU’s influence in 
Central Asia and more widely. The EU 
must, therefore, set itself clearly apart 
from those that place stability above 
progressive change in the region.  
This suggests that the EU should build 
its presence in Central Asia around the 
promotion of a forward-looking agenda 
of modernisation and social and 
political development. This can best be 
achieved through working with those 
groups, communities and countries that 
share a commitment with the EU to 
such change. That is, the EU should 
seek to find ways to assist the countries 
of the region to modernise and develop, 
in accordance with their own ambitions, 
while also ensuring this is not the 
modernisation agenda advanced by 
Russia and China (‘shut up and shop’). 
The EU should focus its efforts on 
helping to build and strengthen the 
foundations for pluralism and law-based 
states and to reinforce and spread the 
reform dynamic across the region. In 
these ways, the EU can challenge 
efforts to renew authoritarianism in the 
region. 
The EU’s approach should be based 
upon looking for real opportunities for 
change and to make use of these. In 
concrete terms, the EU should support 
bilateral and trilateral initiatives and 
regional cooperation designed to build 
closer ties with Europe and to open the 
region more generally through 
transport, energy, trade and investment, 
and communication/media links, but 
also in terms of strengthening human 
capital and promoting exposure to new 
ideas and access to information. At the 
same time, the EU should aim to build a 
framework of political and security 
cooperation within the region that 
rewards and strengthens those that 
demonstrate a genuine commitment to 
reform. A framework of positive 
cooperation should demonstrate the 
benefits of reform and, thereby, place 
pressure on those who seek to oppose 
change and to challenge those who 
argue that sustaining authoritarian 
orders is the only way to ensure stability 
in the region. 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CENTRAL ASIA  
With some of the most authoritarian 
regimes in the world, it is tempting to 
see little prospect for reform in Central 
Asia. The negative political image of 
the region is further compounded by 
analysis that stresses the traditional – 
family and clan – structure of Central 
Asian society and the prevalence of 
non-democratic values. The leaders that 
emerged to dominate the region in the 
years following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union have further strengthened 
the idea that there is little scope for 
change by promoting an ideology of 
authoritarian rule as the only way to 
ensure stability in the region. 
This is a depressing picture but it is also 
misleading. Central Asia is a diverse 
region with a wide variety of ethnic, 
linguistic, religious and social groups. It 
is also a region that has experienced 
different forms of political and 
economic development in the years 
since independence. Some countries, 
such as Kyrgyzstan, have seen the 
emergence of considerable political 
pluralism and a vibrant civil society. 
Others, such as Kazakhstan, have opted 
for economic reforms that have brought 
forth significant private business 
interests. Still others, such as 
Uzbekistan and – at least until recently 
– Turkmenistan have chosen a path of 
concentrating political and economic 
power within the hands of a narrow 
ruling circle. 
The political, economic and social 
diversity that exists across Central Asia 
and the fact that apparently traditional 
societies – for example Kyrgyzstan is 
often identified as a country rent with 
clan alliances – can also be the basis for 
pluralist politics, suggest that it is not 
conservative values and social 
structures that have played the primary 
role in propelling the region towards 
authoritarian government but rather the 
interests and political actions of ruling 
elites. 
In the years ahead, Central Asia is 
likely to become ever more diverse 
under the impact of internal change and 
external engagement and as a result of 
government policies. The change that 
will take place in the region will offer 
significant opportunities for promoting 
an agenda of reform and modernisation. 
There are five particular sources of  
The European Union’s Strategic Role in Central Asia | 3 
dynamism in Central Asia that offer the 
opportunity for EU engagement in 
support of reformist agendas: 
  Elite transition. With the possible 
exception of Tajikistan, the states 
of Central Asia have entered an 
important period of elite change. 
The region’s Soviet-era leadership 
is beginning to be replaced or is 
facing replacement in the near 
future. Differing models of 
transition have emerged; from the 
street and parliamentary politics of 
Kyrgyzstan to the committee-style 
transition of Turkmenistan. In both 
cases, however, the new leadership 
has indicated a desire for change in 
their countries and this offers 
opportunities for the EU to work to 
ensure that the transfer of power 
does not lead to the consolidation 
of new authoritarian regimes. In the 
future, the key elite transitions will 
be Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as 
these will have regional 
significance. In both cases, the EU 
should be ready to signal quickly its 
readiness to support the new 
governments in reform and 
modernization. 
  Economic change. In recent years, 
the economies of Central Asia have 
experienced significant growth, 
although from low starting points, 
driven primarily by strong world 
prices for the region’s natural 
resources. Hydrocarbon exports 
have played a basic role in this 
growth. As a result, parts of Central 
Asia are set to experience important 
economic development. Perhaps 
most significantly, Kazakhstan is 
emerging as by far the most 
wealthy and most dynamic 
economy. The growth of substantial 
indigenous economic resources 
within Central Asia offers new 
opportunities to promote a 
strengthening of investment, 
marketisation and economic 
integration between countries of the 
region. 
  Generational shifts.  While the 
population of Central Asia remains 
predominately poor, there are 
important changes underway across 
the region. Sizeable and influential 
groups are prospering and are 
looking for the emergence of 
societies and political orders that 
can accommodate their own 
aspirations, including a desire to 
play a more active role in decision-
making of various types and to 
ensure their property rights and 
security through rule of law. 
Central Asia is also witnessing the 
emergence into adulthood of the 
first truly post-Soviet generation. 
The desire for access to education 
including international higher 
education is stronger than ever. 
Many of those who have 
experienced post-Soviet education, 
especially abroad, hold 
significantly different views on the 
future of the region from the Soviet 
generation currently in charge of 
the region. Strengthening links 
between the emerging generations 
in Central Asia and the EU – 
principally through education – is 
likely to be one of the most 
important long-term agents for 
reform in the region. 
  Geopolitical influences. During the 
first decade of independence, the 
countries of Central Asia pursued 
policies to consolidate their 
statehood by balancing relations 
between the former Soviet 
hegemon (Russia) and other 
international actors, while at the 
same time seeking to strengthen 
their position within the 
international system. The growing 
role of the Russian Federation and 
China in Central Asia in recent 
years points to a qualitative shift 
from the post-Soviet period and 
threatens to undermine the ‘multi-
vector’ foreign policies of the 
countries in the region. 
  Anxious to avoid a return to 
external domination, some Central 
Asian governments (for example 
Uzbekistan currently) are seeking 
the involvement of other significant 
international actors in the region to 
help to balance the role of Russia 
and China. Some countries (notably 
Kazakhstan) are also looking to 
external actors to help with their 
integration into the competitive 
global economy. The EU has a 
clear opportunity to ensure that the 
desire among Central Asian 
countries to draw the EU into the 
region will be on the Union’s terms. 
  New asymmetries in Central Asia. 
The political, social and economic 
changes occurring in Central Asia 
today – and that are likely to 
accelerate in the future – are 
creating new asymmetries in the 
region. These shifts will create new 
challenges – migration, greater 
inequality – and also new 
opportunities. The critical 
relationship is that between 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
Kazakhstan’s rise threatens to 
eclipse Uzbekistan internationally 
and perhaps even Tashkent’s role in 
Central Asia. The fact that 
Kazakhstan has indicated a 
willingness to pursue reform in 
cooperation with Europe but also 
that past reforms have created an 
internal dynamic for change within 
the country provides a basis for the 
EU to strengthen reform in the 
region and to underline that the 
current policies pursued by the 
leadership in Uzbekistan risk 
leading the country to 
marginalisation. 
PRIORITIES FOR THE EU IN 
CENTRAL ASIA  
As the EU seeks to enhance its role in 
Central Asia, it faces a difficult task. 
The EU needs to build its leverage 
without even the distant prospect of 
membership of the Union for the 
countries of the region and it has at its 
disposal principally ‘soft power’ 
instruments. The Union also faces 
significant competition for influence 
from countries ready to commit greater 
resources to the region with little in the 
way of conditionality for their 
assistance in terms of political and 
human rights policies.  
Given this situation, the EU cannot 
hope to build its engagement in Central 
Asia within the framework of 
conventional competitive great power 
policies. Rather, the EU must 
differentiate itself from the other 
external actors in the region by setting 
out a positive vision of a future Central 
Asia to be achieved through 
modernisation and reform. While many 
point to the forces of conservatism and 
elements of stasis in the region and, 
therefore, stress the need for stability 
and continuity, the EU should position 
itself to support and advance the 
attainment of this vision of change 
through building reform coalitions, 
including both civil society and leading 
figures and groups within the  
4 | Neil J. Melvin 
authorities. But to achieve this, the EU 
will have to establish a comprehensive 
and carefully differentiated engagement 
across the region, designed to build 
leverage through rewarding positive 
change. 
Leverage will only be successful if the 
EU accepts what it can do and avoids 
entering areas where it can have a 
marginal impact. The EU is unlikely to 
be able to build enough leverage to 
persuade the region’s worst dictators to 
change their ways except at a cosmetic 
level – as demonstrated by the lack of 
real progress in the ongoing EU 
dialogue with Uzbekistan. The 
employment of ways to express 
dissatisfaction – including through a 
more effective sanctions regime – 
should remain alongside steps to reward 
positive developments. 
A REGIONAL STRATEGY OF 
BILATERAL RELATIONS IN 
CENTRAL ASIA  
Kazakhstan is the most important 
country for the European Union in 
Central Asia. It will emerge as the 
region’s most powerful nation based on 
its substantial natural resources and 
commitment to economic reform even 
without help from the EU. The 
Kazakhstani authorities have launched a 
number of significant initiatives aimed 
at updating their military, promoting 
modern education and they have 
signalled their ambitions to play a 
greater international political role, 
including as a leading regional actor. 
They have also demonstrated a clear 
ambition to bring about change within 
their country to integrate more 
effectively within the global economy. 
As a result, society in Kazakhstan is 
likely to undergo important additional 
changes with the emergence of new 
groups interested in further change in 
the country. 
The European Union can only hope to 
build an effective strategy for Central 
Asia if it makes a significant 
commitment to strengthening the 
reform drive in Kazakhstan. This 
engagement should be two-fold in 
focus. First, the EU should step up its 
cooperation with the authorities and 
civil society groups in Kazakhstan to 
promote far closer ties with Europe in 
order to strengthen domestic processes 
of social and economic change. 
Secondly, the EU should intensify the 
dialogue with Kazakhstan about 
political reform and a strengthening rule 
of law in the country focused on 
Kazakhstan´s ambition to build closer 
links to European security and political 
institutions. 
Kazakhstan should be offered a real 
prospect of chairing the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) in 2009. In return Kazakhstan 
should introduce a set of measures 
designed to set in motion a process of 
change that will lay the foundation for 
the emergence of a genuine and 
sustainable political pluralism in the 
country. Kazakhstan’s aim to strengthen 
its relationship with the Council of 
Europe could provide the basis for the 
country to be invited to join some of the 
Council’s mechanism – inter alia the 
Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities. 
Astana (the country’s capital since 
1997) could also develop enhanced 
cooperation with the EU in foreign and 
security policies (see below). 
Success in helping Kazakhstan to move 
closer to a European-oriented process of 
modernisation and reform would have a 
substantial impact on the situation in 
Kazakhstan but would also represent a 
dramatic challenge to the leaders of 
other countries in Central Asia. It would 
also challenge other external actors who 
offer little in the way of a future for the 
region that is substantially different 
from the present. 
Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated that 
political reform and a commitment by 
the international community to the 
support of civil society can help to 
establish the basis for the emergence of 
a diverse and dynamic politics. At the 
same time, the difficult economic 
situation in the country and problems 
created by corruption, extremism and 
substantial social divisions pose a 
constant challenge to the country’s 
fledgling political pluralism. The EU 
should focus on strengthening rule of 
law and furthering economic 
development, alongside keeping 
political reform going forward. The EU 
should seek to play an active role in 
moving the authorities and the 
opposition away from confrontation and 
towards a more constructive political 
dialogue. Active work in the area of 
conflict prevention should be stepped 
up. As with Kazakhstan, building 
support among the new generation 
through education should be a priority 
for the EU. 
Tajikistan has some of the poorest 
communities in Central Asia. At the 
same time, the leadership of the country 
is growing increasingly authoritarian 
and undermining some of the positive 
power-sharing arrangements that were 
put in place in the country as part of the 
peace-building effort following the civil 
war (1992-97). In this sense, Tajikistan 
is at a turning point in which there is a 
real prospect of the emergence of a full-
blown authoritarian order closely 
involved in corruption and narco-
trafficking. Policies aimed to tackle 
poverty, corruption and drug trafficking 
should remain a priority for the EU. The 
bilateral EU-Tajikistan relationship is, 
however, likely to be limited reflecting 
the scale of the country’s problems and 
the limited resources of the EU. For this 
reason, the EU should focus on 
cooperation with other external actors – 
notably the United States and Japan – 
on issues of development and the Union 
should aim to function as a catalyst for 
the engagement of multilateral 
organisations and IFIs in the country. 
Turkmenistan  has, until recently, been 
seen as the most stark example of a 
country in which the interests of the EU 
(principally access to gas) stand in 
opposition to its commitment to the 
values of democracy and to human 
rights. The death last December of 
Saparmurat Niyazov, Turkmenistan’s 
President-for-life, offers a significant 
opportunity for the EU to find a new 
relationship with Ashgabad. The EU 
must move quickly to deepen its 
dialogue with the new leadership of the 
country in order to build a significant 
and sustainable dynamic for reform. 
The EU should initially focus its 
engagement on helping the new leaders 
of the country to reverse the damage of 
the Niyazov era in the areas of 
education, health, rule of law and 
media. Work in these areas should be 
used to build confidence and establish 
the basis for a broader political 
discussion on reform. 
Uzbekistan under President Islam 
Karimov has little to offer the European 
Union in terms of its efforts to enhance 
its role in the region and to strengthen 
reform dynamics. While there are 
pressures for change in Uzbekistan, the 
current political regime has through its 
harsh policies towards all voices critical  
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of the ruling regime ensured that these 
are channelled into violent 
confrontation and radical politics. 
President Karimov has provided no 
opportunities for reformist forces to 
emerge that could help to bring forth a 
more pluralist and modernising 
environment. A closer relationship with 
Tashkent is, thus, likely to tarnish the 
image of the Union in the region and 
more broadly and so weaken the EU’s 
ability to play a positive role in Central 
Asia and in other difficult regions of the 
world. 
While it may be important to maintain a 
limited political dialogue with Tashkent 
– in the hope of bringing about a 
softening of pressure on some 
individual human rights cases – this is 
highly unlikely to achieve anything 
other than cosmetic change. Tashkent 
must demonstrate a commitment to real 
reform and introduce the sort of 
changes that will break the iron grip of 
the authorities on society before there 
can be any serious commitment from 
the EU. 
In the absence of such a shift in 
Tashkent, the EU should focus on 
engaging with Uzbekistan and the 
problems created by Tashkent’s policies 
through the range of multilateral 
mechanisms within the region and 
through regional cooperation 
organisations. Here the particular 
concern should be on opening up 
Uzbekistan – focused especially on the 
borders and finding ways to reach the 
country’s emerging generations through 
education and information/media 
policies. Non-official discussions 
between policy experts from Europe 
and Uzbekistan on a range of issues, 
including security issues, should be 
supported as a means to prepare 
cooperative agendas for the post-
Karimov era. 
STRENGTHENING REGIONAL 
ENGAGEMENT 
Regional powers in Central Asia.  The 
growing attention to Central Asia by 
external actors, particularly focused on 
energy and security issues, risks the 
emergence of harmful competition and 
the strengthening of authoritarian 
politics in the region. This is a 
competition that the EU cannot win and 
it would be harmed if it tries to 
compete. 
In response to this situation, the EU 
should adopt a three-fold policy. The 
EU should be firm in the promotion of 
its own vision of a future for Central 
Asia. Second, the EU should strive to 
forge significant political, economic and 
cultural relationships with countries in 
Central Asia that share the Union’s 
vision of reform and that will strengthen 
the ability of those countries to balance 
the involvement of other external 
powers and to pursue their own national 
interests. Thirdly, the EU should seek to 
engage regional powers in forms of 
cooperation that can strengthen the 
EU’s vision of change for Central Asia. 
This should include, for example 
working with the Russian Federation in 
the areas of national minority rights, 
strengthening the Russian and other 
European languages in Central Asia and 
on educational issues, and keeping the 
region open to media and information, 
including Russian media, as well as 
combating drug trafficking. While with 
China, the EU should concentrate on 
cooperation around economic 
investment that diversifies the 
infrastructure of the region and serves 
further to open up Central Asia – 
especially focusing on border issues. 
Finally, the EU should consider 
working more closely with regional 
organisations on issues of regional 
security and economic cooperation – 
notably the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) and Central Asia 
Regional Economic Cooperation 
(CAREC). 
It is also clear that the EU should 
coordinate its engagement with external 
actors that share a broadly common 
vision of Central Asia’s future – 
international agencies such as the IMF, 
the World Bank and others – to help 
ensure that their activities are 
reinforcing positive change. Here the 
EU’s political vision of change in the 
region could set the agenda for 
multilateral investment. Better 
coordination should be undertaken with 
the United States, Japan and, possibly, 
India on key issues to ensure that the 
activities of these countries do not work 
against the EU’s policies for reform.  
Human capital and new ideas. In terms 
of promoting a Central Asia that is 
friendly towards the EU, that is moving 
closer to the values of the EU and is 
committed to opening up to the world, 
the EU has considerable potential to 
play a strong role using soft-power 
instruments focused on enhancing the 
region’s human capital. Promoting a far 
better understanding of the European 
Union in the region is clearly a priority. 
Strengthening diplomatic representation 
is a useful step. But the contacts and 
information flows must go far wider. 
Support for the development of Central 
Asian professional groups and 
strengthened ties to such groups in 
Europe could help serve as a stimulus 
for change. Links between policy 
institutes in Europe and Central Asia 
could help to promote better mutual 
understanding and enhance regional 
knowledge of the successes of the EU 
and how these were achieved. 
The EU also needs a far better 
understanding of the range of processes 
of change in the region through policy-
relevant research. There is an urgent 
requirement for the EU to find out what 
the different people of the region want 
and not just rely for information on 
what the region’s leaders say. This 
suggests that there is a clear need to 
enhance the region’s indigenous 
educational and analytical capacity. 
Providing scholarships to Central Asian 
young people to attend European 
universities can be helpful. But this is 
not a substitute for developing 
indigenous educational and policy 
institutions oriented towards and 
perhaps supported by the EU. 
Ultimately, broad change in Central 
Asia is most likely to come from future 
generations educated to examine 
critically the world in which they live 
and wanting more than to spend their 
lives as politically passive subjects.  
Regional cooperation. Central Asia is a 
diverse region and the contrasts are 
likely to become even sharper in the 
years ahead. Some observers have, 
therefore, questioned the need for an 
EU regional strategy and expressed 
scepticism, based on the lack of past 
success, about whether regional 
cooperation should be promoted by the 
EU. To give up on the agenda of 
regional cooperation would, however, 
be to give up on a variety of issues 
fundamental to the societies of Central 
Asia – notably improving regional 
water management and other 
environmental challenges, cross-border 
trade, education, labour migration and 
the creation of an energy market. 
Building such cooperation should, 
however, be approached in flexible  
6 | Neil J. Melvin 
ways, including carefully focused and 
bilateral and trilateral initiatives that can 
build confidence and mutual 
understanding ahead of efforts to 
promote more comprehensive forms of 
regional cooperation. 
Rule of law and combating corruption. 
Corruption is one of Central Asia’s 
greatest challenges. Widespread 
corruption, including at the highest 
levels in many of the countries of the 
region squanders scarce resources and 
corrodes the legitimacy of state 
institutions. Challenging corruption 
through the promotion of rule of law 
should be a priority of the EU in Central 
Asia in order to ensure more effective 
and legitimate governance. It is also a 
priority that is likely to command broad 
popular support in the region. The EU 
should work with the governments and 
civil society of Central Asia to ensure 
that income from natural resources is 
dealt with in an accountable and 
transparent fashion. Allegations that 
financial institutions in Europe have 
played a key role as repositories for 
monies gained illegally by Central 
Asian dictators and their families should 
be thoroughly investigated. 
Security challenges. In the years since 
independence, many of the leaders of 
Central Asia have developed security 
agendas focused on perceived threats to 
the states of the region. Within these 
agendas, those who criticise and 
politically oppose the ruling regimes are 
often lumped together with other more 
radical and violent threats. 
Such understandings of security are 
incompatible with European notions of 
‘comprehensive’ and ‘human’ security. 
In its dialogue with the authorities in 
Central Asia, the EU must move beyond 
narrow definitions of security and not 
be constrained by the anti-terrorism 
agenda promoted by many of the 
security services in the region. The EU 
should seek though dialogue to broaden 
concepts of security in Central Asia and 
also to strengthen cooperation in the 
area of regional security and conflict 
prevention activities. 
This does not mean that the EU 
approach to security issues should be 
unfocused and confined to ‘soft’ 
questions. The EU should offer 
countries showing genuine progress in 
moving towards European norms the 
opportunity for a closer relationship to 
the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
Some Central Asian countries, 
Kazakhstan for example, might be 
invited to align some of its foreign 
policy positions formally with EU 
foreign and security policy 
‘declarations’. Cooperation might also 
be extended to practical issues with 
Central Asian states invited to 
contribute personnel to ESDP missions 
outside Central Asia, notably in the area 
of crisis management. In the future, the 
EU should seriously consider extending 
elements of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy to those states in 
Central Asia that demonstrate an active 
interest in a closer relationship to the 
EU and a preparedness to enter into a 
substantial dialogue on reform and 
development. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Central Asia is at a crossroads in its 
post-independence development. As a 
result, the European Union has the 
opportunity to play a significant role in 
moving the region, or at a minimum 
parts of the region, away from 
authoritarian rule and towards more 
positive forms of political and economic 
development. Such a shift in the region 
would be in the EU’s interests and also 
represent a significant strengthening of 
European norms in the post-Soviet 
space. 
The EU Strategy for the region is an 
important step for the EU-Central Asia 
relationship but also, potentially, a 
signpost to the future direction of EU 
engagements in other parts of the world. 
Progress in Central Asia would indicate 
that the EU can move beyond its role as 
a European actor – through its policies 
of enlargement and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy – to being an 
international actor with a distinct 
approach and able to operate in the 
politically most difficult regions of the 
globe. 
It is clear that for the EU and Central 
Asia, the Strategy document is only the 
beginning of a new relationship. Much 
will have to be done to ensure the 
implementation of the Strategy and to 
ensure that Central Asia receives 
increased resources in the years ahead. 
It will be critical to ensure that attention 
to the region is sustained beyond the 
German EU Presidency. What is 
equally important is that if the EU is to 
strengthen its influence in Central Asia, 
the Strategy will have to be 
underpinned by a clear, consistent and 
long-term political approach to the 
region that is in accordance with 
European values. It is only on this basis 
that the EU will be able to build an 
effective, sustainable and credible 
presence in the region. About CEPS
Place du Congrès 1 • B-1000 Brussels
Tel : 32(0)2.229.39.11 • Fax : 32(0)2.219.41.51
E-mail:  info@ceps.be
Website : http://www.ceps.be
Bookshop : http://shop.ceps.be
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) is among the 
most experienced and authoritative think 
tanks operating in the European Union today. 
CEPS serves as a leading forum for debate on 
EU affairs, but its most distinguishing feature 
lies in its strong in-house research capacity, 
complemented by an extensive network of 
partner institutes throughout the world.
Goals
•	 To	carry	out	state-of-the-art	policy	research	leading	
to	solutions	to	the	challenges	facing	Europe	today.
•	 To	achieve	high	standards	of	academic	excellence	
and	maintain	unqualified	independence.
•	 To	provide	a	forum	for	discussion	among	all	
stakeholders	in	the	European	policy	process.
•	 To	build	collaborative	networks	of	researchers,	
policy-makers	and	business	representatives	across	
the	whole	of	Europe.
•	 To	disseminate	our	findings	and	views	through	a	
regular	flow	of	publications	and	public	events.
Assets
•	 Complete	independence	to	set	its	own	research	
priorities	and	freedom	from	any	outside	influence.
•	 Formation	of	nine	different	research	networks,	
comprising	research	institutes	from	throughout	
Europe	and	beyond,	to	complement	and	
consolidate	CEPS	research	expertise	and	to	greatly	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	some	120	
Corporate	Members	and	130	Institutional	
Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	practical	
experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	for	the	
utility	and	feasability	of	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
CEPS	carries	out	its	research	via	its	own	in-house	
research	programmes	and	through	collaborative	
research	networks	involving	the	active	participation	of	
other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies
Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
Justice	&	Home	Affairs
Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI)
European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.